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The cognitive appraisal of an event is crucial for the elicitation and differentiation of emo-
tions, and causal attributions are an integral part of this process. In an interdisciplinary
project comparingTonga and Germany, we examined how cultural differences in attribution
tendencies affect emotion assessment and elicitation. Data on appraising causality and
responsibility and on emotional responses were collected through questionnaires based
on experimentally designed vignettes, and were related to culture-specific values, norms,
and the prevailing self-concept.The experimental data support our hypothesis that – driven
by culturally defined self-concepts and corresponding attribution tendencies – members of
the two cultures cognitively appraise events in diverging manners and consequently dif-
fer in their emotional responses. Ascription of responsibility to self and/or circumstances,
in line with a more interdependent self-concept, co-varies with higher ratings of shame,
guilt, and sadness, whereas ascription of responsibility to others, in line with a less inter-
dependent self-concept, co-varies with higher ratings of anger.These findings support the
universal contingency hypothesis and help to explain cultural differences in this domain on
a fine-grained level.
Keywords: culture, cognition, emotion, appraisal theory, causation and responsibility, attribution biases, universal
contingency hypothesis
INTRODUCTION
Interactions between people of different cultural background are
often strained with misunderstandings, some of which arise from
diverging cognitive appraisals of the situation in which they are
involved or of the event they face. Are these differences due to
idiosyncratic features of the respective situation and the persons
involved, or do they reflect deeper, more systematic disparities
between cultures? If the latter is the case, precisely which cultural
variables affect the way in which events are cognitively appraised
and emotions elicited? And conversely, what do these differences
reveal about emotions and their cognitive, social, and cultural
determinants?
These questions address a core issue of cognitive science,
namely how culture interacts with cognition (Bender et al., 2010;
Bender and Beller, 2011b), but they also draw on appraisal the-
ories of emotion and on attribution theory. Appraisal theories
assume that emotions are elicited and differentiated by the cogni-
tive appraisal of an event (e.g., Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus,
1991; Frijda, 1993; Scherer et al., 2001; Fontaine et al., 2007).
Appraising events in similar ways should lead to similar emotions,
whereas appraising them differently should lead to different emo-
tions. Appraising causation is where attribution theory enters the
picture (e.g., Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985; Hewstone, 1989; Weiner,
1995). In their attempt to find explanations for others’ (or their
own) behavior, people often fall prey to attribution biases. The
self-serving bias (Miller and Ross, 1975), for instance, leads people
to take more credit for positive outcomes than for failures, thus
eventually enhancing the likelihood of pride elicitation.
Appraising an event at the onset of an emotional response
and attributing it to causal factors are processes which are seen
per se as being independent of culture. Nevertheless, the ways in
which these processes take place, the factors that affect them, and
therefore also the results to which they lead are prone to cultural
variation. The self-serving bias, for instance, is reinforced by the
individualistic values of “Western” cultures, whereas in cultures
valuing smooth interpersonal relationships, this bias is reversed
(Anderson, 1999). Similarly, cultural differences in the elicitation
of emotions have also been documented, both in detailed stud-
ies and large surveys (Mauro et al., 1992; Kitayama and Markus,
1994; Scherer and Wallbott, 1994; Roseman et al., 1995; Scherer,
1997a,b; Mesquita and Ellsworth, 2001). According to the uni-
versal contingency hypothesis, as put forward by Ellsworth (1994;
and see Lazarus, 1991; Mesquita and Frijda, 1992; Scherer, 1997b),
appraising events in a similar way should lead to similar emotions,
irrespective of culture. That is, if an action is regarded a success,
a likely response will be pride, but whether the action is regarded
as a success depends on a whole range of factors, among them
culture-specific concepts, values, and norms. However, there has
been not much cross-cultural research on the universal contin-
gency hypothesis. In particular, the impact exerted by culture is
often not pinned down to concrete components, and systematic
differences in attribution tendencies are not used to predict or
explain corresponding differences in appraisal and emotions, at
least not to a larger extent (cf. Oyserman et al., 2002).
Our study tries to fill this gap. It is based on the assump-
tion that culturally defined concepts affect attribution tendencies
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and thereby alter emotional responses to given events. In order to
investigate this impact empirically, we focused on the elicitation
of anger and compared Germany with the Polynesian culture of
Tonga, for which previous studies suggest systematic differences
along crucial cultural dimensions and particularly with regard
to anger elicitation (Bender et al., 2006, 2007a,b; Nerb et al.,
2008; Beller et al., 2009a). After briefly depicting the theoretical
and cultural background of our study, this paper presents new
data that more systematically relate culture-specific concepts and
attribution tendencies to emotional responses.
COGNITIVE DETERMINANTS OF ANGER
When confronted with an event of personal relevance, people
immediately, spontaneously, and for the most part unconsciously
start appraising the event along several dimensions (e.g., Lazarus,
1966). While the exact nature of the appraisal dimensions and their
corresponding cognitive determinants remain a subject of debate
(e.g., Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Ortony et al., 1988; Lazarus, 1991;
Frijda, 1993; Scherer, 1997a, 2001; Roseman, 2001; Kuppens et al.,
2003), most approaches agree that the determinants eliciting anger
encompass a negative valence of the event (i.e., the degree of dam-
age), its causation by another person, and high responsibility of
this person. Results are more heterogeneous with regard to the
question of whether the ability to control the event also contributes
to anger and with regard to the more content-specific determi-
nants of anger such as unfairness or immorality (cf. Ellsworth and
Smith, 1988; Weiner, 1995; Roseman et al., 1996). In the context
of our study, we will focus on causation (agency) and responsi-
bility as those determinants that differentiate anger from related
emotions, and we will look at damage as the determinant for the
intensity of the emotional response.
ASCRIBING AGENCY
In principle, events can be caused by oneself, another person, or
circumstances, and responsibility can be considered as rather high
or low (e.g., Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Roseman et al., 1996; Nerb
and Spada, 2001). Although such a strict distinction is pervasive in
theory, in practice the two dimensions are often conflated. If a girl
drops a glass because she slips on the floor, we may still consider
her as the cause, but not as responsible. In this case, low personal
responsibility is not much different from circumstantial causation.
Personal responsibility is discounted if the agent is not able to dis-
tinguish right from wrong or to control the respective behavior, or
if he or she behaved in such a way in pursuit of a higher goal (e.g.,
Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995; Nerb and Spada, 2001).
Importantly, folk-psychological concepts and terminologies do
not differentiate emotional responses to all combinations of cau-
sation and responsibility either. Whereas self- and other-caused
events elicit clearly different emotions when high responsibility
is ascribed, causation is less clearly attributed and may even be
regarded as circumstantial when personal responsibility is assessed
as low (see also Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). In the following, we
will therefore distinguish three cases only (Figure 1): causation by
other, by self (each with high responsibility), or by circumstances
(low responsibility). For negative events, the emotions corre-
sponding to the corners of this triangle are anger for other-caused














FIGURE 1 | Emotional responses to negative events varying in the
source of agency and responsibility.
with high responsibility1, and sadness for circumstances-caused
events or with low responsibility.
As everyday life teaches us, people also get angry at themselves
in situations in which it was them who caused the negative event.
However, this anger at oneself was largely neglected in appraisal
theories for many years. Only recently, a systematic comparison
with other-anger, shame, and guilt revealed that self-anger takes a
middle-position between other-anger and shame/guilt (Ellsworth
and Tong, 2006). In particular, self-anger differs from other-anger
in appraisals of causation, fairness, and control, and it differs from
shame/guilt in appraisals related to the obstacle and its moral value,
and in the actual feeling of boiling inwardly. While these find-
ings provide a detailed characterization of self-anger in the US,
the question of whether self-anger occurs cross-culturally remains
open so far.
Cross-cultural studies (e.g., Ben-Zur and Breznitz, 1991; Mauro
et al., 1992; Roseman et al., 1995; Scherer, 1997a,b; Gidron et al.,
1998; and see Mesquita and Ellsworth, 2001, for an overview) pro-
vide evidence for similar links between such sets of determinants
and specific emotions across cultures, particularly for basic emo-
tions like anger, sadness, and shame/guilt. But they also suggest
cultural differences in appraisal tendencies that hinge, to a con-
siderable extent, on the way in which causation is attributed and
responsibility is ascribed.
ATTRIBUTION TENDENCIES AND ANGER
Although not all appraisal processes require the identification of a
specific cause, some do – particularly those involved in eliciting the
“attribution emotions” like pride, shame, or anger (Ortony et al.,
1988). However, appraisal theories and attribution theory differ
with regard to the number of causes to be distinguished. Most
1The definition of shame/guilt as largely self-caused emotion is prototypical, but
not exhaustive, and may itself depend on cultural context. Research on Chinese, for
instance, indicates that a general category of shame may subsume both self-shame
and other-shame. Other-shame describes the types of shame-like feelings one may
feel in response to another person’s actions (Li et al., 2004). For pointing us to this
reference, we thank one of our anonymous reviewers.
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appraisal theories typically differentiate three sources of causation,
whereas attribution theory focuses on two types of attributions
only: one primarily referring to the person and his or her dispo-
sitions (internal attribution) and one primarily referring to the
situation (external attribution). In order to integrate these diverg-
ing causal conceptions of attribution theory and appraisal theories,
one can take advantage of the differences in perspective between
actor and observer. Following Watson (1982), who rephrased this
distinction in terms of self and other, we can relate the terminol-
ogy of attribution theory more closely to that used in appraisal
theories, with self vs. other as endpoints of the agency dimension,
and internal vs. external locus (i.e., self/other vs. circumstances)
as endpoints of the responsibility dimension (see Figure 1).
As accurately assessing causation requires cognitive effort and
attention, people may fall prey to a range of biases when mak-
ing attributions. Among the most important biases are the actor
observer difference (Jones and Nisbett, 1972; Watson, 1982), the cor-
respondence bias (formerly called fundamental attribution error;
Ross, 1977; Jones, 1990; Ross and Nisbett, 1991; Gilbert and Mal-
one, 1995), and the self-serving bias (Miller and Ross, 1975).
These attribution tendencies have consistent effects, not only with
regard to the ascription of responsibility, but also – as part of the
appraisal process – with regard to the emotional responses: for
negative events, they should generally increase both the ascription
of responsibility to others and, consequently, the likelihood of an
angry response, and they should decrease both the ascription of
responsibility to self and the likelihood of shame/guilt. However,
these attribution tendencies do not occur universally, but appear
to be systematically affected by culture.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND CONSEQUENCES
The majority of cross-cultural studies concerned with attribu-
tion and appraisal processes identify cultural differences along
one dimension each: individualistic vs. collectivistic values (Hof-
stede, 1980; Triandis, 1995), an independent vs. interdependent
self-concept (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), implicit theories of
individual vs. group agency (Menon et al., 1999; Morris et al.,
2001), or analytic vs. holistic systems of thought (Norenzayan and
Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett et al., 2001). Despite differences within and
across each of these traditions, all of them share an emphasis on the
relation between individual and group (for a synthesis, see Peng
et al., 2001; for an alternative approach see Fiske, 1992). In recent
years, parts of this cross-cultural approach have been criticized
from various perspectives for theoretical, conceptual, and method-
ological reasons (e.g., Takano and Osaka, 1999; Fiske, 2002; Oyser-
man et al., 2002). We took these critiques seriously and therefore
developed our research from sound anthropological fieldwork.
Culture-specific self-concepts and attribution tendencies
Self-concepts are among the most extensively investigated and
documented modulators of responsibility ascription. Their two
dimensions independence and interdependence, although not
entirely mutually exclusive, focus on diverging aspects. A more
independent self-concept is typically emphasized in “individual-
istic” cultures in which self-esteem is supported, personal accom-
plishments are important for one’s identity, and rights are valued
over duties. In more“collectivistic”cultures, on the other hand, the
interdependent aspects of the self are emphasized. People are seen
as parts of larger social groups that bind and mutually obligate
them, social harmony is of prime concern, and duties are valued
over rights (Hsu,1981,1983; Markus and Kitayama,1991; Triandis,
1995).
These cultural differences should have implications for attribu-
tions. And indeed, various comparisons between US Americans,
prototypical of individualistic Western cultures (Hsu, 1983), and
members of the more collectivistic East Asian cultures like China
reveal important differences. Americans tend to overestimate the
role of dispositional factors in defining behavior and therefore
ascribe higher personal responsibility to the actor (i.e., the other)
than Asians, who are apparently more willing to take information
about situational influences into account (e.g.,Miller,1984; Morris
and Peng, 1994; Morris et al., 1995; Choi and Nisbett, 1998). The
latter effect may result from attributing to a different entity, namely
to groups instead of individuals (Menon et al., 1999), but the rel-
evant point remains: with regard to individuals, attribution styles
diverge significantly – the correspondence bias is less pronounced
in collectivistic countries like China than in individualistic Western
countries.
In a similar manner, maintaining and enhancing one’s self-
esteem is an appropriate matter of concern in individualistic
cultures, thus paving the way for the self-serving bias. The reversed
pattern is found in collectivistic cultures, where smooth inter-
personal relationships are more important than self-esteem (e.g.,
Anderson, 1999).
Implications for emotions
If we assume that attributing causation and ascribing responsi-
bility are crucial for the elicitation and differentiation of specific
emotions, then cultural differences in attribution styles should lead
to different emotional responses, at least in terms of intensity (e.g.,
Ellsworth, 1994; Scherer, 1997b; Mesquita and Ellsworth, 2001;
Mesquita and Markus, 2004). Accordingly, a divergence in these
biases should entail a divergence in emotional responses. More
precisely, the correspondence bias, being more pronounced in
individualistic cultures, should result in ascribing higher responsi-
bility to others, thereby also enhancing anger in negative events. In
collectivistic cultures, on the other hand, personal responsibility
and the subsequent emotional responses should be reduced (for
effects of the self-serving bias see Anderson, 1999; Bender et al.,
2006).
Besides affecting the elicitation of emotions, attribution ten-
dencies could also affect the way in which emotions themselves are
attributed to other people. Given that many emotions are linked
to cultural values and some are even socially sanctioned, self- and
other-serving biases may affect the readiness with which people
perceive these emotions in themselves or others. However, to the
best of our knowledge, this type of impact is yet to be investigated.
And finally, the degree of perceived negative valence (or “dam-
age”), which accounts for the intensity of the experienced emotion,
partly depends on cultural definitions of what counts as negative in
the first place. Norm violations, for instance, will only be regarded
as negative if the violated norm and the underlying values (e.g.,
social harmony or self-realization) are shared in the respective
culture.
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VALUES, SELF-CONCEPT, AND EMOTIONS IN TONGA AND
GERMANY
The purpose of our paper is twofold: we are trying to find an expla-
nation for apparent differences in emotional – and particularly
angry – responses to similar events across cultures (i.e., between
Germany and Tonga), and we are trying to empirically corroborate
our conjecture that these differences are brought about by differ-
ences in attribution styles, triggered by culture-specific concepts
and values.
The choice of Tonga for the comparison is justified by several
reasons: the small Polynesian kingdom with its venerable history
(Campbell, 2001) is renowned for its cultural resilience and the
strong cohesion of its core social units. Its cultural context is clearly
distinct from both the holistic tradition of East Asian philosophy
and the analytic tradition of Western philosophy (Nisbett et al.,
2001), and therefore provides an interesting extension to the more
common American-Asian comparisons2. Extensive anthropolog-
ical fieldwork in Tonga, much of it conducted on indigenous folk
psychology, values, and emotions (e.g., Marcus, 1978; Bernstein,
1983; Martin, 1991; Morton, 1996; Bender, 2001, 2002; Evans,
2001; Bender and Beller, 2003; Bender et al., 2007a,b) allows us to
integrate our experimental data into the broader context of Ton-
gan culture, with its emphasis on social relationships, appropriate
behavior in interactions, and the control of specific emotions.
Tongan society is hierarchically structured with asymmetrical
relationships according to rank and status originating from within
the nuclear family. Linked with these differences in rank are social
rules of respect and obedience. Consequently, the father’s sister or
mehekitanga – as the highest-ranking person in one’s family – is
entitled to request all kinds of support, and obeying these requests
is regarded not only obligatory, but also an expression of respect.
Disrespectful behavior (particularly vis-à-vis a person of higher
rank) is thus among the most frequent causes for anger, followed
by violations of justice and fairness, but also events that, in one
way or another, curb participants’ personal freedom (Bender et al.,
2007a).
In contrast, the traditional German values discipline, obedi-
ence, or tidiness are increasingly displaced by values that focus on
self-realization such as independence, self-confidence, the abilities
to judge and to assert oneself (Pross, 1982), supplemented by the
general wish of having a good life (Noelle-Neumann and Petersen,
2001; Bender et al., 2007a). Potential causes for anger elicitation
therefore include those factors experienced as obstructing own
goals, such as incompetence, unpunctuality or unreliability, but
also the violation of norms of justice and fairness.
In Tonga, people are to a large degree determined in their
options and activities by other members of their social network.
Whereas such an experience may be regarded as negative by West-
ern (i.e., individualistic) standards, the willingness to help and
share and the strong social support that come with it are highly
2Of course, like most Pacific island countries,Tonga was subject to European colonial
endeavors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and is nowadays integrated into
globalized political and economic networks, predominantly with Western countries,
but also with China and other East Asian countries. Nevertheless, the fundamental
cultural values and social structure have only partly been affected by these cultural
influences (e.g., van der Grijp, 1993; Morton, 1996; Evans, 2001; Lee, 2003).
valued by most Tongans. Such attitudes are regarded as proper
expressions of ‘ofa, which is the core value in Tongan culture.
‘Ofa – roughly to be summarized as “love, fondness, kindness,”
but also referring to concern, care, help, and generosity – char-
acterizes the ideal emotional relationship between people and is
“the philosophy behind their way of life” (Kavaliku, 1977, p. 67).
As social harmony is particularly emphasized, socially disruptive
emotions like anger and open conflicts are disapproved of.
If we relate these observations to the core theoretical constructs
of cross-cultural research, we may infer that people in Tonga
value interdependence more than independence and particularly
more than Germans do. Previous studies support this assumption,
revealing a significantly stronger interdependent self-concept for
Tongans than Germans (and even Chinese), whereas the inde-
pendent aspects of the self are rated rather similarly3 (Beller and
Bender, 2004; Bender et al., 2006; Beller et al., 2009a). However,
previous studies also showed that differences in self-concept must
not be regarded as the only factor relevant for differences in causal
attribution and responsibility ascription. For instance, a study on
how causal roles are assigned in the physical domain demonstrated
the relevance of linguistic factors and culture- (and domain-) spe-
cific concepts (Beller et al., 2009b; Bender and Beller, 2011a),
and a systematic variation of situations involving social induce-
ments points toward situational aspects as at least as, if not more,
influential than differences in self-concept (Beller et al., 2009a).
Empirical studies based on vignettes also support our assump-
tion that the two cultures differ with regard to attribution tenden-
cies. In response to a questionnaire that contrasted positive and
negative events, German and Tongan participants alike are more
ready to take responsibility for good deeds than for bad. However,
their ascriptions of responsibility to others diverge in interesting
ways: Germans do so to a greater degree for bad deeds, while Ton-
gans do so for good deeds. This corresponds to a strong self-serving
bias in Germany, eliciting relatively little shame for bad deeds, but
a great deal of pride for good ones. The reversed attribution ten-
dency in Tonga eclipses the initial self-serving bias and produces
a high degree of shame for bad deeds and a lower degree of pride
for good ones (Bender et al., 2006).
Encouraged by these results from previous studies, we set out to
extend our analysis of how culture and cognitive processes inter-
act in shaping emotions, focusing now on the correspondence bias
and the conditions under which anger is elicited – and elicited dif-
ferently in the two cultures. In this paper we present data from a
new experiment that was conducted with a larger number of par-
ticipants and that more systematically varied causes and contents.
As we are particularly interested in principles that affect the elic-
itation of anger, the experiment was restricted to negative events
and to anger and some of its conceptual “neighbors” along the
attributional dimensions.
3This lack of difference on the independence subscale is in line with the notion
that the two dimensions independence and interdependence are not mutually exclu-
sive, and thus need not be expressed antithetically across cultures (for respective
evidence, see Oyserman et al., 2002). In fact, a strong (cultural) focus on interde-
pendence is not per se incompatible with the (individual) desire to also keep one’s
independence whenever possible. This is reflected in the sketch of cultural values,
which express dislike both for disrespectful behavior and for events that curb one’s
personal freedom.
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In order to test our hypotheses, two sets of vignettes were used
that systematically vary content and causation, respectively. For
the first set, we chose instances of norm violations and varied the
degree to which the respective norm is relevant in the two cul-
tures. We expected to find differences in the appraisal of damage,
corresponding to the salience of the violated norm, and respec-
tive differences in the intensity of specific emotions. The second
set depicted negative events in which a personal (though socially
oriented) goal is obstructed and the source of causation is explic-
itly varied: by oneself, another person, or circumstances. Here, we
expected Tongans to ascribe responsibility for these events more
evenly to the three causes than their German counterparts. Again,
emotional responses should reflect these patterns of attributions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In order to ensure a valid choice of terminology and scenarios, the
construction of the experimental material was based on extensive
anthropological fieldwork in Tonga by the first author, which con-
sisted of participant observation, informal talks, interviews, pile
sorting tasks, and linguistic analyses (for more details see Bender
et al., 2007a). This paper focuses on a study based on question-
naires with experimentally varied vignettes and ratings for the
frequency of emotions. The respective material was the first part
of a larger survey; only those parts of the material and results
relevant to our current questions are reported here.
PARTICIPANTS
For theoretical and methodological reasons, we recruited students
from higher years of secondary schools4. The German sample con-
sisted of 254 students from a high school in Siegen (121 male,
131 female, 2 did not indicate their gender), with a mean age of
14.8 years (range: 13–19 years). The Tongan sample consisted of
65 students from a high school in Pangai (35 male, 29 female, 1
did not indicate his or her gender), with a mean age of 15.7 years
(range: 13–18 years). Participants were recruited in the classroom
and rewarded by contributions to their class funds. Due to missing
values, some participants had to be excluded, but in order to retain
as many participants as possible the exclusions were conducted
separately for each calculation.
MATERIAL
Data was collected with different tools: one scale for assessing
the self-concept, one emotion frequency questionnaire, and one
questionnaire based on experimentally varied vignettes.
Self-concept scale
To assess self-concept, we used the Self-Construal Scale of Singelis
(1994) in a slightly shortened version (two inconsistent items in
4In theory, we had a choice between high school students, university students, and
older people. Older people are not familiar with questionnaires and rating scales,
and the majority of Tongan university students are enrolled overseas. High school
students are more familiar with questionnaires than older people and, in addition,
are more representative of the whole population than university students – with
the exception of their age. However, competence related to a particular age is not
required for experiencing emotions, but only for the restriction of emotion. Juvenile
participants, one may assume, could be more willing to admit to emotions to which
adults might not admit. If we still find cultural differences between the two groups,
they should accordingly have even more weight.
each subscale were eliminated in order to enhance reliability5).
Participants were instructed to rate the degree to which each state-
ment applied to them on a five-point scale ranging from 0 (“not
at all”) to 4 (“completely”).
Emotion frequency questionnaire
Participants also had to assess the frequency of a range of emotions.
For exploratory purposes, the list contained 19 different emotions,
including both positive and negative ones. Among the emotions
were anger, anger at oneself, shame, guilt, and sadness. The ques-
tionnaire was constructed in two versions and administered in a
between-subjects design. The self-referenced version asked partic-
ipants to state how often they themselves had experienced the
respective emotions within 1 week, while the other-referenced
version asked them to state how often their classmates had experi-
enced these emotions. Again, frequencies were rated on a five-point
scale ranging from “very rarely” to “very often.”
Please note that we did not intend to rely on the actual values
of reported frequencies, as these may be severely affected by mem-
ory biases (Levine et al., 2006), but were primarily interested in
differences between the self- and other-referenced versions.
Vignettes
The vignettes consisted of two sets of scenarios, each followed
by a range of questions. The scenarios were constructed as fol-
lows: first, we collected events both in Germany and Tonga that
elicited negative emotions by way of emotion diaries in which
participants were also requested to specify details of the emotion-
eliciting events (Bender et al., 2007a). Based on these events, we
derived scenarios and systematically varied them for each triplet.
In the first triplet, content was varied. Each story portrayed an
interaction between two people, one of whom is violating a specific
norm. The norms are: respecting one’s father’s sister (TN=Tongan
norm), being punctual (GN=German norm), and judging fairly
(SN= shared norm). Two of the scenarios were constructed so as to
elicit anger asymmetrically: scenario TN deals with a norm specific
to the Tongan culture (where the father’s sister is the highest-
ranking person in a family), GN with a norm specific to Germany.
Finally, the SN scenario deals with a norm shared by members of
both cultures and is supposed to elicit anger symmetrically in both
cultures. As we are particularly interested in the role of responsi-
bility, the scenarios make clear the negative outcome and depict
the other person as causing the damage, but personal responsibility
can be attributed differently. The phrasing of the scenarios runs as
follows:
TN: Mary is David’s aunt, and she lives in the same road as David’s
family. Mary instructs David to go shopping for the party she is
planning. David tells his aunt that he can’t do it.
5The following items were excluded: for interdependence “I should take into consid-
eration my parents’ advice when making education/career plans” and “Even when I
strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument,” and for independence
“I’d rather say ‘No’ directly, than risk being misunderstood” and “I feel comfortable
using someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older
than I am.” Apart from being inconsistent with the rest of the subscale, two of them
(the first and the last) didn’t make sense in the Tongan context and/or to the pupil
sample with whom we worked.
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GN: Peter and James want to meet up. However, James arrives
almost one hour later than they have arranged.
SN: During a ball game, John is very committed. When attempt-
ing to score a decisive point, John is fouled by a player of the
opposing team. The referee lets them continue their game.
The second triplet varied the sources of causation (OC= other-
caused, SC= self-caused, CC= circumstances-caused). Two sources
of causation (i.e., other and self) correspond to high personal
responsibility, while the third (i.e., circumstances) corresponds to
low personal responsibility6. While the negative outcome is stated
and causation is varied, personal responsibility can be attributed
differently. The phrasing of the scenarios runs as follows:
OC: Tom has just bought a gift and is walking down the street
with it. Suddenly he is pushed by a boy. The gift falls to the ground
and breaks.
SC: Tom has just bought a gift and is walking down the street
with it. Suddenly he stumbles. The gift falls to the ground and
breaks.
CC: Jane has organized a big party outside to which she has
invited many guests. Everything is prepared and festively deco-
rated and all of the guests have arrived, when suddenly a storm
breaks. The party falls through.
Each story in each triplet was followed by several questions.
The first question asked participants to take the perspective of
the affected persons and to rate their emotional responses in the
event (e.g., “Which feelings will Peter have to what extent because
James arrives almost one hour later than they have arranged?”).
A multiple-choice format was used, with 11 emotions covering
an array of negative states, among them anger (German: Ärger,
Tongan: ‘ita), sadness (Traurigkeit, loto-mamahi), shame (Scham,
ma¯), and guilt (Schuld, loto-tautea)7. For the second triplet with
causation varied, anger at oneself (Ärger über sich, ‘ita ‘ia kita
pe¯) was added. For each emotion, participants had to indi-
cate its intensity on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all”
to “very.”
Subsequent questions asked for an assessment of how severe
(schlimm, kovi) the specific incident is (i.e., negative valence or
damage) and of how responsible other, self, and circumstances are
for the specific incident. Again, participants had to indicate their
ratings on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very.”
6As we are particularly interested in correlations of ascriptions to self and other,
we used the same content for these two scenarios, varying the source of causation
only, despite the risk of carry-over effects. The third scenario differed in content,
which might render comparability difficult, but – as we will see below – it had to be
analyzed separately in any case.
7The remainder consisted of indignation, helplessness, dislike, pity, regret, disap-
pointment, and contempt, and was supplemented by an open question. Please note
that, although indignation would have been particularly interesting – as it consti-
tutes a sub-case of anger related to norm violations – this is the case in German only;
in Tongan, we didn’t find a term close enough in meaning to warrant its inclusion
in the subsequent analyses (this lack of lexical correspondence does not imply, of
course, that the feeling itself could not be recognized; cf. Sauter et al., 2011).
All materials were presented in the participants’ native lan-
guage and used customary names for the persons involved. Trans-
lation took place through English and was conducted by one
German/English bilingual person, two English/Tongan bilingual
persons, and one person with fluency in German, English, and
Tongan. The translations were double-checked by native speak-
ers and pre-tested to ensure comprehensibility. A larger range
of Tongan emotion terms was elicited with free-listing and col-
lected from interviews and daily conversations in Tonga. Those
used in our study were selected after semantic tests and consul-
tation with native speakers of Tongan8. Particular care was taken
concerning anger, the emotion of prime interest in our study. In
order to combat reservations by a line of research that empha-
sizes the incommensurability of emotion terms across languages
(e.g., Lutz, 1982, 1988; Wierzbicka, 1999; Durst, 2001; Harkins and
Wierzbicka, 2001), we included in our preparatory work a system-
atic comparison of the different components of the anger sequence
that established sufficient similarity between the emotional cores
of German Ärger and Tongan ‘it a (Bender et al., 2007a).
Typicality of all scenarios was checked by asking participants
(n= 21 high school students in Tonga and 39 in Germany) in an
otherwise similarly designed pilot study how typical they consid-
ered the depicted scenarios. No significant differences were found
between cultures. Usability of the rating scales was also pre-tested
in Germany and Tonga.
PROCEDURE
Data collection took place in the classrooms. Each participant
received a booklet with general instructions, the vignette question-
naire, the scale, and the frequency questionnaire (in this order).
The scenarios in each triplet were presented within subjects, with
the first triplet first, followed by the second. Within triplets, the
order of the vignettes was randomized to control for order effects.
Each story began on a new page; the questions and answering
options were presented in the same order as described above. Par-
ticipants were instructed to answer all questions in the given order,
and were granted as much time as they needed.
HYPOTHESES
The general idea is based on the observation that, on certain occa-
sions, Tongan and German emotional responses differ markedly.
The main purpose of our study is therefore to identify content-
specific causes for these differences. Specifically, we expected that
cultural differences in emotional responses (1) depend on the
content of events, but (2) may also arise from differences in attri-
bution processes, in line with the prevailing self-concept. Hypoth-
esis (1) thus states that the more salient a violated norm in a
given culture, the greater its assessment as damage and the more
8Of the emotion terms under investigation, only “shame” was not entirely similar in
the two languages. More strongly than the German term Scham, which is sufficiently
close to the English translation, the Tongan word ma¯ also includes notions of shy-
ness and embarrassment. However, as “shame” is the prototypical emotional state
referred to with this term, and ma¯ its only gloss, we decided to use it nonetheless,
thus hazarding the possible consequence that lower frequencies of reporting Scham
in Germany could be simply due to the more restricted meaning of this term, as
compared to ma¯ in Tonga. The inclusion of guilt in the analyses partly serves to
compensate for this drawback.
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intense the emotional response. Hypothesis (2) states that the less
interdependent the self-concept, the more prone to the correspon-
dence bias (which reduces likelihood to take circumstances into
account), and the more likely to respond with anger.
In addition, the status of anger at oneself as a potential response
to negative events will be addressed. Here, we assume patterns
largely similar to those for shame and guilt, namely high ratings
for events caused by self and low ratings for other-caused events.
DATA ANALYSIS
Data were analyzed using SPSS versions 15 and 17. For repeated-
measures Analysis of variances (ANOVAs), multivariate results will
be reported in detail where appropriate, and the results of follow-
up univariate analyses will be described briefly in the text, with
details provided in tables. These results are reported to provide
for an overview of the cross-cultural differences and similarities
in appraisal dimensions and emotional responses. However, given
our hypothesis on the culture-specific, indirect effects of the dif-
ferent scenarios on participants’ emotional responses via appraisal
dimensions, we additionally conducted analyses of moderation
and mediation effects, as originally described by Baron and Kenny
(1986) and later adapted to within-subjects designs (Judd et al.,
2001) and multiple mediator models (Preacher and Hayes, 2008;
more details on this are provided in Appendix).
RESULTS
SELF-CONCEPT IN TONGA AND GERMANY
In line with our previous studies (Beller and Bender, 2004; Bender
et al., 2006; Beller et al., 2009a), we expected the Tongan students to
be more interdependent than the German students (whereas inde-
pendence was never found to produce significant differences). This
pattern was replicated in the present study. ANOVA of the two sub-
scales of the Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994) showed a signif-
icant intercultural effect for interdependence [F(1, 266)= 132.69,
p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.33], with higher values observed in Tonga
(M = 3.11, SD= 0.57) than in Germany (M = 2.18, SD= 0.55).
With regard to independence, the two cultures did not differ (Ger-
many: M = 2.50, SD= 0.56; Tonga: M = 2.48, SD= 0.60; F < 1).
The results thus confirmed that our sample of Tongan partici-
pants is more interdependent than the German sample, which is a
necessary precondition for testing our main hypotheses.
EMOTION FREQUENCIES FOR SELF AND OTHER
In order to obtain some evidence on how much our experimen-
tal data may be affected by social desirability, our participants
were requested to assess the frequency of a range of emotions in
either a self-referenced or other-referenced version. In view of the
specific evaluation of emotions in the two cultures, we assumed
that socially disruptive emotions such as anger should be reported
more frequently in Germany than in Tonga, whereas the reverse
should hold for conciliatory emotions (and particularly shame and
guilt). In particular, the underlying cultural evaluations of emo-
tions should contribute to an impact of culture-specific attribution
tendencies on the attribution of emotions. If this assumption
holds, then our German participants should – due to the self-
serving bias – attribute negative emotions more readily to others
than to themselves, whereas the reverse should take place in Tonga
ensuing from the reversed self-serving (i.e., other-serving) bias.
The frequency data for the relevant emotions anger, anger at
oneself, shame, sadness, and guilt were analyzed by multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) with culture and reference (self
vs. other) as between-subjects factors. Results showed a signifi-
cant overall effect of culture [F(5, 273)= 16.86, p< 0.001, partial
η2= 0.24] as well as a significant culture× reference interaction
[F(5, 273)= 4.55, p= 0.001, partial η2= 0.08]. By contrast, there
was no significant overall effect of reference (F < 1).
Subsequent univariate analyses (Table 1) demonstrated culture
effects for all five emotions: values for anger, anger at oneself, and
sadness were higher in Germany, whereas ratings of both shame
and guilt were higher in Tonga. Interaction effects were limited to
anger, shame, and guilt (Figure 2).
These results support our hypotheses. First, our assumptions
on cultural differences were largely corroborated for shame and
guilt as well as for anger (but not for sadness; which resonates
with findings from Nerb and Spada, 2001). Interestingly, anger
at oneself is also reported more often in Germany than in Tonga,
Table 1 | Univariate effects of reported emotion frequencies.
M (SD)G M (SD)T F df p part. η2
CULTURE EFFECTS
Anger 2.37 (1.00) 1.53 (1.26) 28.00 1, 277 <0.001 0.09
Anger at oneself 2.10 (1.20) 1.25 (1.22) 22.52 1, 277 <0.001 0.08
Shame 1.25 (1.01) 1.73 (1.28) 9.42 1, 277 0.002 0.03
Guilt 1.63 (1.19) 2.24 (1.31) 12.31 1, 277 0.001 0.04
Sadness 2.09 (1.29) 1.73 (1.34) 4.00 1, 277 0.047 0.01
CULTURE×REFERENCE EFFECTS
Anger cf. Figure 2 cf. Figure 2 8.02 1, 277 0.005 0.03
Anger at oneself 0.02 1, 277 0.892 0.00
Shame 7.92 1, 277 0.005 0.03
Guilt 8.12 1, 277 0.005 0.03
Sadness 0.00 1, 277 0.996 0.00
G, Germany; T, Tonga.
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FIGURE 2 | Reported frequency ratings for anger, anger at oneself, shame, guilt, and sadness as a function of culture and reference (self vs. other).
even though it shares salient features with shame and guilt, namely
that it is directed toward the self (cf. Ellsworth and Tong, 2006).
Presumably, it is its aggressive component that renders it less avail-
able for Tongan participants. Secondly, and more importantly, the
significant interaction effects were in accordance with our expec-
tations of self- and other-serving biases in Germany and Tonga,
respectively, in that higher frequency ratings were obtained in the
other-referenced version of the questionnaire in Germany, whereas
the opposite was true in Tonga.
While the main effects of culture could be due to a range
of factors, including memory biases9 (Levine et al., 2006), the
culture× reference interaction can be interpreted as an effect
of culture-specific attribution tendencies on the attribution of
emotions.
VIGNETTES I: NORM VIOLATIONS
Having established that our samples systematically differ in impor-
tant aspects of self-concept and emotion assessment, we went on
to test whether these differences are reflected in subjects’ appraisal
9In principle, these main effects could also be due to culture-specific patterns in
responding to rating scales. To control for such tendencies (as advised by one of
the anonymous reviewers), we conducted a second MANOVA, based on centered
means that were calculated by subtracting the overall mean across all emotions
of each cultural group (M G = 1.89, SDG = 0.73; M T = 1.69, SDT = 0.71) from
the emotion-specific individual responses. This analysis produced almost identi-
cal results and still obtained an overall main effect of culture [F(5, 273)= 16.44,
p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.23], thus speaking against response tendencies as the only
relevant factor.
patterns and whether the latter, in turn, lead to different emotional
responses, as is predicted by the universal contingency hypothesis
(Ellsworth, 1994).
Cultural differences in appraisal and emotion
First, we examined whether appraisal and emotion ratings indeed
differed between cultures for the chosen scenarios, by subjecting
the vignettes data to repeated-measures MANOVAs. While dif-
ferences between scenarios were expected to occur, these are not
interesting per se, but rather only in interaction with culture. Sce-
nario main effects will therefore be reported, but not analyzed in
detail.
The scenarios of triplet 1 all explicitly described events with
negative outcomes caused by another person. We therefore
expected a general tendency to ascribe more responsibility to oth-
ers than to self or circumstances in both cultures; accordingly anger
should be the prevailing emotional response. However, culture-
specific attribution tendencies should also cause differences in
the relative intensities of responsibility ascription to the three
sources (self/other/circumstances) and corresponding differences
in additional emotions related to self and circumstances. Aside
from the shared core characteristics, the scenarios of triplet 1 sys-
tematically varied the cultural salience of the norm violated (GN
specific for Germany, TN specific for Tonga, and SN shared by
both). We therefore also expected considerable culture× scenario
interactions.
Multivariate analysis of the appraisal data for this triplet
detected significant effects of culture [F(4,217)= 17.62,p< 0.001,
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partial η2= 0.25], scenario [F(8, 213)= 14.42, p< 0.001, partial
η2= 0.35], and culture× scenario [F(8, 213)= 11.38, p< 0.001,
partial η2= 0.30]. Univariate tests demonstrated that overall
cultural differences were limited to ratings of other- and self-
responsibility (Table 2). As expected, the degree of other-
responsibility is rated significantly higher in Germany than in
Tonga, whereas Tongans ascribe more responsibility to self than
Germans do.
The culture× scenario interaction, on the other hand, was
due to differences in ratings on all four appraisal dimensions
(Figure 3A). In particular, the assessment of damage switched
between cultures with the cultural salience of the violated norm
(higher in Germany for the German norm, higher in Tonga for the
Tongan norm). It is also interesting to note that circumstances were
most explicitly considered by our Tongan participants in the ball-
game scenario (SN), where more than two people are interacting.
Table 2 | Univariate effects of (a) appraisal dimensions and (b) emotional responses for triplet 1 (GN, SN, andTN).
M (SD)G M (SD)T F df p part. η2
APPRAISAL DIMENSIONS
Culture effects
Damage 2.83 (0.76) 2.69 (1.11) 1.42 1, 220 0.235 0.01
Other-responsibility 2.79 (0.74) 1.99 (0.90) 41.01 1, 220 <0.001 0.16
Self-responsibility 0.73 (0.66) 1.53 (1.08) 25.10 1, 220 <0.001 0.10
Responsibility of circumstances 1.47 (0.82) 1.73 (0.96) 0.79 1, 220 0.377 0.00
Culture× scenario effects
Damage cf. Figure 3A cf. Figure 3A 16.76 2, 440 <0.001 0.07
Other-responsibility 3.68 2, 440 0.030 0.02
Self-responsibility 9.30 2, 440 <0.001 0.04
Responsibility of circumstances 17.06 2, 440 <0.001 0.07
EMOTIONAL RESPONSES
Culture effects
Anger 2.80 (0.62) 2.67 (0.91) 1.04 1, 269 0.308 0.00
Shame 0.59 (0.72) 1.61 (1.07) 77.47 1, 269 <0.001 0.22
Guilt 0.51 (0.67) 1.92 (1.14) 137.19 1, 269 <0.001 0.34
Sadness 1.78 (0.92) 2.67 (0.94) 46.71 1, 269 <0.001 0.15
Culture× scenario effects
Anger cf. Figure 3B cf. Figure 3B 20.52 2, 538 <0.001 0.07
Shame 1.58 2, 538 0.207 0.01
Guilt 0.72 2, 538 0.482 0.00
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FIGURE 3 | Intensity ratings of (A) appraisal dimensions and (B) emotional responses for triplet 1 as a function of culture and scenario.
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Multivariate analysis of the emotion ratings for the first
triplet of scenarios also showed significant effects of culture
[F(4, 266)= 43.23, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.39], scenario [F(8,
262)= 16.40, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.33], and culture× scenario
[F(8, 262)= 6.75, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.17]. Subsequent uni-
variate analyses (Table 2) indicated that Tongans and Germans
differed in their ratings of shame, guilt, and sadness, with Ton-
gans displaying higher values on all three variables. The cul-
ture× scenario interaction was strongly pronounced for anger,
indicating that anger intensity was higher when a culturally salient
norm had been violated (Figure 3B).
Overall, these results support our hypotheses. Emotional
responses to norm violations depend on the salience of the norm
(i.e., the perceived degree of damage) and on the sources to which
responsibility is ascribed. As Germans predominantly ascribe
responsibility to others, they also predominantly respond with
anger. Tongans, on the other hand, also consider other sources
and give higher ratings for other emotions.
Appraisal as mediator of cultural differences
In order to combine the results on appraisal and emotion data
reported above within the same model, we conducted additional
analyses of moderator and mediator effects, as originally described
by Baron and Kenny (1986) and later adapted to within-subjects
designs (Judd et al., 2001) and multiple mediator models (Preacher
and Hayes, 2008; for a detailed description, see Appendix). This
allows for a direct test of our main hypothesis, namely that cultural
differences in emotional responses to the different scenarios are
mediated by appraisal. In order to facilitate interpretation, we will
focus on the emotion of principal interest (i.e., anger) and on the
two scenarios that depicted culture-specific norm violations and
accordingly yielded clear cultural differences in event appraisal
and emotional responses (i.e., scenarios GN and TN).
Results of the Preacher and Hayes (2008) method applied to
appraisal and anger difference scores of scenarios TN and GN
demonstrated partial mediation of the moderating effect of culture
on anger: that is, while the direct effect (c ′) remained significant
when all potential mediators were simultaneously considered, it
was substantially reduced by the significant indirect effect (aibi).
These results are depicted in Figure 4. They corroborate our
interpretation of the results presented in the preceding section:
it appears that cultural differences in anger intensity are primar-
ily mediated by differences in the appraisal of damage. However,
this effect is not complete as demonstrated by the still significant
direct effect of culture× scenario on anger, and this indicates that
other appraisal dimensions may be relevant for explaining cul-
tural differences in anger ratings, or that other processes besides
the appraisal of the event may affect emotional responses.
VIGNETTES IIA: SELF VS. OTHER
The scenarios of triplet 2 all described cases in which a material
damage occurs that also bears on social relations (gift or party),
but they were construed so as to systematically vary causation (by
other in OC, by self in SC, and by circumstances in CC). However,
whereas the first two scenarios were interpreted in a similar way in
the two cultures, this did not hold for the CC scenario. Recall that
the CC scenario described a party canceled due to a sudden storm.
While weather conditions were regarded as circumstantial in Ger-
many, they were attributed to God – and thus personally (i.e., to






























FIGURE 4 | Results of mediated moderation analyses combining the
approaches of Judd et al. (2001) and Preacher and Hayes (2008) for
scenariosTN and GN from triplet 1.The moderating effect of culture was
found to be partially mediated by perceived damage, but not via the
responsibility dimensions. Direct path coefficients (ai , b i , c, c ′) are noted at
their respective arrows; indirect effects (aibi) are indicated inside the mediator
boxes; proportion of explained variance is indicated for the dependent variable
anger. All values reflect normal-theory based testing, but were verified by
additional randomization analyses with 10,000 bootstraps. Single asterisks
indicate 0.0001≤p<0.05, double asterisks p<0.0001.
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Both the response patterns and the explanations provided clearly
indicated this. The CC scenario was therefore analyzed separately
and will be reported in the next section.
Cultural differences in appraisal and emotion
With regard to the other- and self-caused events, we expected dam-
age to be assessed similarly across scenarios and cultures (and in
fact, the damage occurring is nearly identical in both scenarios).
Ascription of responsibility, on the other hand, should depend
on the source of causation upon which the respective scenario
focuses. Besides this general tendency, we further expected Ton-
gans to ascribe responsibility more evenly and, in particular, take
circumstances into account more readily in the other-caused sce-
nario than Germans. The variation in causation should also trigger
different emotional responses: anger in the other-caused scenario,
and shame and guilt in the self-caused scenario. Although anger
at oneself is rarely made the subject of discussion in this field (for
an exception, see Ellsworth and Tong, 2006), people frequently
become angry following negative events caused by themselves. In
triplet 2, we therefore included anger at oneself in the list of emo-
tions, and we assumed that results would be largely similar to those
for shame and guilt.
Multivariate analysis of the appraisal data showed significant
effects of culture [F(4, 232)= 4.60, p= 0.001, partial η2= 0.07],
scenario [F(4, 232)= 65.38, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.53], and cul-
ture× scenario [F(4, 232)= 17.06, p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.23].
Subsequent univariate analyses (Table 3) showed intercultural
differences pertaining to damage ratings and to ratings of
responsibility of circumstances: our German participants rated
damage slightly higher than Tongans, who in turn rated the
influence of circumstances higher than Germans. The cul-
ture× scenario interaction was due to differences in all three
dimensions of responsibility ascription (Figure 5A).
As predicted, appraisal patterns followed the variation in cau-
sation, and Tongans ascribed responsibility more evenly: in the
other-caused scenario they ascribed it less to others but more to
self than Germans; in the self-caused scenario, this pattern switches
(this finding will be taken up below in the section on interdepen-
dent responsibility ascription). Interestingly, Tongans do consider
circumstances much more for negative events caused by others
than by self, and this is perfectly consistent with the previously
observed pattern of a reversed self-serving bias (Bender et al.,
2006).
Multivariate analysis of the emotion data also revealed sig-
nificant effects of culture [F(5, 248)= 11.03, p< 0.001, par-
tial η2= 0.18], scenario [F(5, 248)= 46.85, p< 0.001, partial
η2= 0.49], and culture× scenario [F(5, 248)= 8.08, p< 0.001,
partial η2= 0.14]. Univariate tests of these effects (Table 3) indi-
cated intercultural differences for four of the five emotions: for
anger, shame, guilt, and sadness. Corresponding to the results for
the first triplet of scenarios – and corroborating our hypothesis –
Tongans displayed higher values for shame, guilt, and sadness,
while anger ratings were higher in Germany. Finally, differences
in emotional responses across scenarios were less pronounced
Table 3 | Univariate effects of (a) appraisal dimensions and (b) emotional responses for the other-caused (OC) vs. self-caused (SC) scenario.
M (SD)G M (SD)T F df p part. η2
APPRAISAL DIMENSIONS
Culture effects
Damage 3.42 (0.91) 2.99 (1.18) 4.78 1, 235 0.030 0.02
Other-responsibility 2.01 (0.64) 1.92 (1.05) 0.04 1, 235 0.852 0.00
Self-responsibility 2.13 (0.69) 1.94 (0.76) 1.57 1, 235 0.211 0.01
Responsibility of circumstances 1.58 (0.99) 2.25 (1.30) 11.71 1, 235 0.001 0.05
Culture× scenario effects
Damage cf. Figure 5A cf. Figure 5A 0.01 1, 235 0.909 0.00
Other-responsibility 36.85 1, 235 <0.001 0.14
Self-responsibility 31.12 1, 235 <0.001 0.12
Responsibility of circumstances 31.92 1, 235 <0.001 0.12
EMOTIONAL RESPONSES
Culture effects
Anger 3.47 (0.81) 3.05 (1.19) 6.62 1, 252 0.011 0.03
Anger at oneself 2.12 (0.77) 1.97 (1.08) 0.97 1, 252 0.325 0.00
Shame 1.19 (1.05) 2.21 (1.13) 33.33 1, 252 <0.001 0.12
Guilt 2.03 (0.97) 2.58 (1.10) 11.68 1, 252 0.001 0.04
Sadness 2.57 (1.04) 3.05 (0.98) 9.35 1, 252 0.002 0.04
Culture× scenario effects
Anger cf. Figure 5B cf. Figure 5B 3.69 1, 252 0.056 0.01
Anger at oneself 34.76 1, 252 <0.001 0.12
Shame 6.10 1, 252 0.014 0.02
Guilt 14.41 1, 252 <0.001 0.05
Sadness 5.10 1, 252 0.025 0.02
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FIGURE 5 | Intensity ratings of (A) appraisal dimensions and (B) emotional responses for the other-caused (OC) vs. self-caused (SC) scenario as a
function of culture and scenario.
in Tonga than in Germany (as were differences in appraisal).
Culture× scenario interaction effects were significant for anger at
oneself, shame, guilt, and sadness, but only marginally significant
for anger (Figure 5B). The findings indicate that Tongans respond
more strongly to the outcome of the event itself (i.e., the damage
caused) than to its causes, whereas emotional responses among
the German sample differentiated much more with regard to
responsibility.
It is also worth noting that in both cultures, the switch in cau-
sation, and accordingly in the ascription of responsibility, across
scenarios is reflected most precisely by anger at oneself – in fact,
more precisely than by shame or guilt, and particularly more than
by anger.
Mediated moderation analyses
As for the first vignettes triplet, we went on to test whether
appraisal patterns could conceivably mediate the moderating effect
of culture on participants’ emotional response patterns to the two
scenarios. As for scenarios TN and GN, we used difference scores
for emotional responses and appraisal dimensions to take into
account our within-subjects design,and conducted multiple medi-
ator analyses as proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) on these
scores. Separate analyses were conducted for anger and anger at
oneself as dependent variables.
In accordance with the results presented in the preceding
section, analyses of anger scores indicated an only marginally sig-
nificant moderating effect of culture (c path, p= 0.071). In turn,
none of the indirect effects via the appraisal dimensions were sig-
nificant either (all p≥ 0.19). Results for anger at oneself as the
dependent variable, on the other hand, indicated significant indi-
rect effects via self- and other-responsibility, both if tested based on
normal theory and following 10,000 bootstraps (detailed results
in Figure 6). Again, mediation of the moderating effect of culture
was not complete, as indicated by the still significant c ′ path. One
reason why indications of self-anger appear to be more sensitive to
experimental variation than other-anger could be that the scenario
itself involves the self as cause in both the OC and SC version – after
all, it is Tom (the person himself) who lets the gift fall down.
These findings indicate that cultural differences in the expres-
sion of anger at oneself, an emotion rarely studied in the context
of appraisal theory, are partly mediated by differences in the
attribution of responsibility for negative events to oneself and
others. It remains to be tested whether the lack of moderation
and mediation effects for other-anger observed across the present
scenarios generalizes to other cases where responsibility of oneself
or another person appears as the dominant factor of a negative
event.
It is interesting to note that for both anger at oneself (cf.
Figure 6) and anger, culture moderated the effect of scenarios
SC and OC on ratings of responsibility of circumstances, but that
this appraisal dimension in turn did not have any effect on either
of the two dependent variables. This suggests that external cir-
cumstances for a negative event are not translated into any form
of anger, in accordance with the idea that negative events caused
by circumstances beyond one’s control should elicit sadness rather
than anger.
VIGNETTES IIB: ACTS OF GOD VS. CIRCUMSTANCES
As mentioned above, interpretations of scenario CC (in which
the party had to be canceled because of a sudden storm)
diverged across cultures. While the storm was regarded as cir-
cumstantial by our German participants, the «person» respon-
sible for the storm triggered ascription of responsibility to
other among many Tongan participants. Treating the CC sce-
nario thus separately obviously precludes the sort of mod-
eration and mediation analyses employed above to test the
hypothesis of culture-specific emotional responses as being medi-
ated via appraisal patterns. Analyses of cultural differences in
appraisal and emotions are nevertheless reported for complete-
ness.
Multivariate analysis of the appraisal data for this scenario
showed a significant effect of culture [F(4, 241)= 12.27, p< 0.001,
partialη2= 0.17] which was due to differences in ratings of all four
appraisal dimensions (Table 4). While Germans rated damage and
responsibility of circumstances higher, Tongans did so for other-
and self-responsibility.
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FIGURE 6 | Results of mediated moderation analyses for anger at oneself across scenarios SC and OC from triplet 2. Results indicate partial mediation of
the moderating effect of culture by perceived self- and other-responsibility; all conventions as in Figure 4.
Table 4 | Univariate effects of (a) appraisal dimensions and (b) emotional responses for the circumstances-caused scenario (CC).
M (SD)G M (SD)T F df p part. η2
APPRAISAL DIMENSIONS
Damage 3.46 (0.90) 2.77 (1.50) 17.53 1, 244 <0.001 0.07
Other-responsibility 0.71 (1.26) 1.60 (1.49) 19.02 1, 244 <0.001 0.07
Self-responsibility 1.04 (1.23) 1.58 (1.50) 7.07 1, 244 0.008 0.03
Responsibility of circumstances 3.09 (1.28) 2.02 (1.64) 25.55 1, 244 <0.001 0.10
EMOTIONAL RESPONSES
Anger 3.38 (1.07) 2.62 (1.57) 16.28 1, 259 <0.001 0.06
Anger at oneself 1.28 (1.37) 1.49 (1.56) 0.89 1, 259 0.346 0.00
Shame 1.49 (1.27) 2.66 (1.37) 31.97 1, 259 <0.001 0.11
Guilt 1.26 (1.35) 2.47 (1.53) 29.48 1, 259 <0.001 0.10
Sadness 2.93 (1.17) 2.79 (1.44) 0.56 1, 259 0.454 0.00
Multivariate analysis of the emotion data again revealed a sig-
nificant effect of culture [F(5, 255)= 13.72, p< 0.001, partial
η2= 0.21], which was due to differences in ratings of anger, shame,
and guilt (Table 4). Germans displayed higher ratings of anger,
while Tongans gave higher ratings for shame and guilt. Ascribing
responsibility to others as much as to self, Tongans also responded
with anger to a degree similar to shame and guilt. Interestingly, the
angry responses of our German participants do not consistently
follow from their appraisal pattern: although their ascription of
responsibility to other is far outweighed by ascription to circum-
stances, they still indicate anger as their most intensive emotion,
apparently triggered by their assessment of damage.
DISCUSSION
Overall, we found corresponding cultural differences in the three
types of variables under scrutiny: in the prevailing self-concept,
in the relevant cognitive determinants of emotions, and in the
emotional responses themselves. Germans appear to have a less
interdependent self-concept than Tongans. In general, they also
tend to appraise more damage, ascribe more responsibility to
others, and accordingly respond with anger more often or more
intensely than Tongans. Tongans, in turn, ascribe more respon-
sibility to self and circumstances, which results in higher rat-
ings for shame and guilt as well as sadness, respectively. This is
largely confirmed by an analysis of how moderating effects of
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culture on anger are mediated by the appraisal of damage and
responsibility.
While the above summary adequately describes the overall ten-
dencies, three exceptions need to be emphasized. First, assessing
damage and responding angrily depends on the cultural salience
of the eliciting event. The violation of norms, for instance, gives
rise to anger in both cultures, but only if the respective norm
is generally agreed upon. When switching between the Tongan-
specific norm violation and the German-specific norm violation,
the appraisal patterns switch accordingly between cultures. In this
case, the cultural impact on anger is mediated by the appraisal of
damage (cf. Figure 4).
Second, while Tongans – at least in general – tend to ascribe
more responsibility to self and circumstances and less to others
than Germans, this pattern switches in cases in which Germans
ascribe responsibility to these sources to a large extent (e.g., in
the self-caused and circumstances-caused scenario, respectively).
In other words: Tongans ascribe responsibility more moderately
and more evenly to the three potential sources of causation than
Germans (who tend to focus on one single source for each sce-
nario). These tendencies are reflected in emotional responses,
which are generally more evenly spread in Tonga and more focused
in Germany.
This pattern could be a side effect of an interdependent self-
concept, according to which people are not individually respon-
sible, but rather collectively responsible. Concurring evidence is
reported by Menon et al. (1999) and Morris et al. (2001), who
found that members of collectivistic cultures tend to ascribe
responsibility to a different entity, namely to groups instead of
individuals (and see Mesquita and Markus, 2004). It is also inter-
esting to note that Tongans consider circumstances less readily
when the damage is caused by self than by others, while the oppo-
site holds for Germans. Consistent with previous findings (Bender
et al., 2006), this pattern corresponds to a self-serving bias in
Germany and a reversed self-serving bias in Tonga.
Third, the general ascription pattern is also reversed in the
circumstances-caused scenario. Apparently, the storm responsible
for the canceled party was interpreted by German participants as
caused by circumstances, while this was only partly the case in
Tonga, where often a personal agent was also held responsible. Yet,
in this case, the reason for the divergence is more interesting than
the divergence itself, as it indicates that cultural differences occur
even with regard to how causes are categorized. While respective
effects of culture on causal categorization have been explored in
various domains (e.g., Malinowski, 1948; Bender, 2001; O’Barr,
2001; Bang et al., 2007; Froerer, 2007; Astuti and Harris, 2008;
Nerb et al., 2008; Beller et al., 2009b; Bender and Beller, 2011a),
its impact on the cognitive determinants for emotion elicitation
clearly deserves more attention in future research (cf. Ellsworth,
1994).
Taken together, these experimental data and the data collected
using the emotion frequency questionnaire suggest that Tongans
emphasize and experience self-related negative emotions more
strongly than Germans. Socially disruptive emotions, on the other
hand, and particularly anger, appear less frequently in Tonga than
in Germany. As we have detailed above, this difference in occur-
rence is linked to differences in the cultural evaluation of anger.
Do we therefore have to assume that our data are determined by
social desirability? We do not believe this to be the case, at least
not extensively, for three reasons: first, although cultural norms in
Tonga restrict the portrayal of socially disruptive emotions in pub-
lic, they do not prohibit talking about such emotions or admitting
to them in an abstract way. Second, those of our Tongan par-
ticipants who had to rate the frequency of their own emotions
actually indicated more anger than those who rated others’ emo-
tions. And third, the response patterns in our experimental setting
changed consistently with the eliciting determinants, as predicted.
In other words, Tongans had to indicate less anger simply because
they rated damage less strongly and ascribed less responsibility to
others. Nevertheless, the results of the frequency questionnaire do
indicate that estimations about emotions are biased – otherwise,
they should not differ with regard to self- or other-referencing.
However, these differences are in accordance with more general
attribution tendencies in each culture and thus more likely reflect
these tendencies than socially motivated response tendencies.
On the other hand, we can (and need) not rule out that the
cultural evaluation of specific emotions may affect the appraisal
tendencies to a similar extent as the cognitive appraisal affects
emotion elicitation. Such an assumption is supported by coher-
ence models of cognition and emotion (e.g., Thagard, 2000; Nerb
and Spada, 2001; Thagard and Nerb, 2002) as well as by Scherer
and Brosch’s (2009) proposition that cultural values may encour-
age certain types of appraisal tendencies (see also Mesquita and
Walker, 2003). A similar argument was put forward in Bender et al.
(2007a): they observed that, in cultural contexts with a strong dis-
approval of anger, factors that would give rise to anger tend to be
discounted.
Clearly, the methods we adopted restrict the range for general-
ization. Our participants were recruited from only one high school
in each country, and the vignettes were constructed from situa-
tions familiar to this part of the population. However, the prime
goal of our study was not to collect a representative sample of
typical emotions and their frequency of occurrence in the two cul-
tures, but to scrutinize the cognitive determinants and processes
that elicit specific emotional responses and to identify the fac-
tors that may affect those processes. Given this goal, restrictions
in sample and vignettes appear not to be too severe. More cru-
cial are questions of validity connected to the use of vignettes.
The advantage of this kind of studies is their internal validity:
they allow us to interpret – with considerable confidence – dif-
ferences in emotional responses as effects of the experimental
manipulation in appraisal dimensions. With regard to external
validity, however, vignette studies are disadvantaged, if one is
interested in “real” emotions. Do vignette studies really assess
emotional responses and their cognitive determinants, or do they
assess folk-psychological theories about how emotions are elicited?
Importantly, we are interested in folk-psychological theories about
how emotions are elicited. In fact, our main concern was to collect
data that speak to questions of how members of different cultures
process information that is related to emotions.
In addition,however,we believe that our data also speak to emo-
tion elicitation itself. While we cannot entirely compensate for the
disadvantage mentioned above, convergent findings from two dif-
ferent sources encourage us to believe that we did get as close to
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the “real” emotions as is possible in this kind of research. First, the
findings presented here replicate findings from previous research
in Tonga on related topics (Bender, 2002; Beller and Bender, 2004;
Bender et al., 2006, 2007b; Beller et al., 2009a). And second, our
inferences on the cultural framing of emotions in Tonga are further
backed up by anthropological research on emotional responses in
daily life and on the social structure and cultural values pertaining
to emotions (e.g., Morton, 1996; Bender et al., 2007a). Further-
more, the converging evidence gathered by appraisal theoretic
research is increasingly regarded as supporting the assumption
that folk-psychological ideas are in fact a good indication of how
emotions are elicited (Scherer et al., 2001).
More generally, our results on self-concept and its impact on
cognitive determinants of emotions are consistent with findings
from research on attribution styles (e.g., Morris et al., 1995, 2001;
Choi and Nisbett, 1998). In particular, the patterns for ascribing
responsibility follow the cultural differences in self-concept in the
predicted way. For instance, one of our pervasive findings is that
Tongans emphasize and experience self-related negative emotions
such as shame and guilt more strongly, but socially disruptive
emotions such as anger less strongly than Germans. An analogous
variation was reported by Kitayama et al. (2006) for Japan and the
US, where, again, prevalence of socially engaging vs. disengaging
emotions depended on which type of self-concept was favored in
the respective culture10.
Yet, our study does not simply attest such cultural variation, but
attempts to provide an explanation for it on a more fine-grained
level by integrating the observed cultural differences in attribu-
tion tendencies with a cognitive, appraisal-theoretical account.
This allows us to account for cultural differences in emotional
responses not only as a result of culture-specific concepts and
values, but as mediated by differences in appraisal patterns.
In doing this, our study also contributes to appraisal theo-
ries, as it identifies how culture-specific appraisal patterns are
affected by differences in attribution styles. In general, the observed
correspondence between cognitive determinants and emotional
responses reflects appraisal-theoretical findings (e.g., Ellsworth
and Smith, 1988; Smith et al., 1993; Roseman et al., 1995, 1996;
Scherer, 1997a). Despite the label as the “Friendly Islands,” peo-
ple in Tonga seem to experience anger in ways similar to Bender
et al. (2007a) and nearly as often as people in Germany. Even the
cognitive determinants eliciting anger are largely the same: anger
is elicited by an appraisal of damage and other-responsibility,
whereas self-responsibility co-varies with shame and guilt. For
most cases, the effect of scenarios on appraisal and emotional
responses was stronger than the effect of culture.
But beyond these general similarities, remarkable differences
can also be discerned, at least in terms of detail: although the
same set of cognitive determinants is accountable for the elicita-
tion of anger, these do not appear to be equally important across
cultures. While in both cultures the assessment of damage con-
tributes more strongly to angry responses than does ascribing
10In a similar vein, the Tongan pattern of emphasizing negativity of the self in rela-
tion to others, and the reversed pattern among our German participants resonate
with findings on the cross-cultural variation in self-serving bias or self-enhancement
vs. criticism (e.g., Kitayama et al., 1997; Heine et al., 1999).
responsibility to others, this tendency is even stronger in Tonga.
Here, the outcome of an event seems to determine the result-
ing emotion more than the assessment of who is responsible
(this is particularly apparent in the second triplet, where causa-
tion was systematically varied). This interpretation is consistent
with the more balanced patterns of both responsibility ascription
and emotional responses in Tonga. Across all scenarios (except
the ambivalent CC scenario), sadness is significantly stronger in
Tonga than in Germany and, in four out of six scenarios, it is
even stronger than anger. These findings concur with previous
work by Kuppens et al. (2003), who found empirical evidence for
a contingent association between cognitive determinants and the
emotional response, rather than a strong link between the two.
Applied to our findings, this would entail that responsibility is
less strongly focused upon and subsequently less accessible in the
Tongan culture (for additional support see Bender et al., 2007a);
consequently, it offers less predictive validity for certain emotions
as compared to Western cultures.
We also found evidence for a necessary differentiation with
regard to anger itself. Most appraisal theories predict anger as a
response to negative events caused by other people, and shame and
guilt as responses to negative events caused by oneself. Our data
from both the frequency and the vignettes questionnaires show
that anger can occur in response to self-caused events – not as
often in Tonga as in Germany, but nevertheless quite frequently
in both cultures, thus replicating the findings of Ellsworth and
Tong (2006) in a non-Western culture. In fact, anger at oneself
even reflects changes in causation and ascription of responsibility
much more precisely than the self-related emotions shame and
guilt. Conversely, and again similar to Ellsworth and Tong’s (2006)
findings, we did not find considerable differences in the relation-
ship of guilt and shame across cultures (cf. Fontaine et al., 2006).
In our scenarios, guilt is always nearly as high as or even higher
than shame in both cultures, with nearly parallel patterns. In addi-
tion, both guilt and shame are consistently higher in Tonga than
in Germany.
To conclude, our findings supplement previous evidence that
cultural concepts and preferences have an impact on attribution
tendencies. In Germany and Tonga, this impact could be demon-
strated for attributing emotions to others, for the relative focus
on specific appraisal dimensions, and for patterns of ascribing
responsibility. Even more importantly, these same cultural con-
cepts and preferences also affect subsequent emotional responses,
in that they emphasize personal responsibility differently. Our
experimental evidence for such an impact therefore supports a
cognitive explanation for cultural differences in emotions that is
more differentiated than previous accounts. In addition, though,
our findings also indicate that other culture-specific factors besides
self-concept are at work in shaping cognitive appraisals of causa-
tion and responsibility (cf. Beller et al., 2009a,b). Identifying and
assessing these additional factors requires – and deserves – more
research in the future.
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APPENDIX
APPRAISAL AS MEDIATOR OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Our analyses of moderation and mediation effects is based on pro-
cedures originally described by Baron and Kenny (1986) and later
adapted to within-subjects designs (Judd et al., 2001) and multiple
mediator models (Preacher and Hayes, 2008).
Previously published methodological work has examined the
analysis of moderator and mediator effects in within-subject
designs (Judd et al., 2001) and the combined analysis of multi-
ple mediators (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). However, to the best
of our knowledge the simultaneous consideration of these two
problems has not been investigated in detail. We therefore com-
bined the two published approaches by first calculating difference
scores for the dependent variable anger, as well as sum and dif-
ference scores for all mediator variables (damage, responsibility of
self/other/circumstances), as suggested by Judd et al. (2001). This
approach incorporates the main effect of the different scenarios
on anger ratings in the difference scores which function as the
dependent variable. Testing for effects of culture on these differ-
ence scores thus amounts to testing the interaction of culture and
scenario on anger ratings.
Figure A1 shows the complete model of direct and indirect
effects (Preacher and Hayes, 2004) to be tested. This model com-
bines (1) a moderation model testing whether the interaction of
culture and scenario has a significant effect on anger ratings, and
(2) a mediation model testing whether effects of scenario, culture,
or their interaction on anger ratings are mediated via the four
appraisal dimensions of interest. The simplified model resulting
from the use of difference scores is highlighted in black.
The Judd et al. (2001) approach to within-subject analysis of
moderator and mediator effects does not in itself provide for
testing combinations of these two processes: mediated modera-
tion and moderated mediation (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Muller
et al., 2005). However, as it simplifies the interaction between the
independent variable and the potential moderator to a simple
effect of the moderator on difference scores, standard mediator
analyses can be used on this “camouflaged” moderator effect to
test our principal hypothesis, namely whether cultural differences
in anger ratings are mediated by differences in event appraisal.
We employed the procedure proposed by Preacher and Hayes
(2008), which allows for the simultaneous testing of several poten-
tial mediators, both based on normal distribution theory and using
re-sampling techniques. Whereas the traditional Baron and Kenny
(1986) approach rests on a descriptive comparison of the direct
paths linking the predictor to the dependent variable (i.e., c and
c ′) in the presence or absence of potential mediators, the solution
proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) allows for a direct signif-
icance test of the indirect paths (aibi) and thus a more stringent
test of the model.
One drawback of these methods is that the combined analysis
of appraisal and emotion data across two scenarios exacerbates
the problem of missing data: while cases with missing data only
rarely exceeded 10% of responses per variable for the analyses
reported in the preceding section, combined analysis of all vari-
ables would have led to sample attrition of up to 40% in both
cultures. We therefore employed multiple imputation as imple-
mented in SPSS/PASW 17 to complete our dataset for the four
emotions and the four appraisal dimensions of interest. Standard
settings were used and results of the fifth iteration were employed
for all subsequent analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). In order
to assess potential effects of data imputation, we repeated the
analyses reported above using the completed dataset. The only
difference was that main effects of culture on responsibility of
circumstances and on anger are now significant. This is proba-
bly due to the increased power with higher N. Importantly, it has
no negative consequence for the interpretation of our results. For
the scenarios of triplet 2, no changes in significance levels were
observed when imputed data were used.
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FIGUREA1 | Basic model of direct and indirect effects on anger.The
model assumes that the moderating effect of culture (i.e., the
culture× scenario interaction) on anger is mediated via the appraisal
dimensions of damage and responsibility (of self, other, and
circumstances). Using difference scores in order to take into account our
within-subjects design, we effectively tested the simplified model printed
in black. Paths ai designate the direct effects of the culture× scenario
interaction; paths b i are the direct effects of the mediators on the
dependent variable anger. Path c is the total effect of the
culture× scenario interaction on anger; path c ′ is the direct effect
remaining once the indirect effects via the potential mediator variables are
taken into account. A significant c path in conjunction with a
non-significant c ′ path indicates complete mediation, but the analyses we
employed also permit direct significance testing of the aibi paths.
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